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This article focuses primarily on the interrelated 
economic development project of the St. Louis 
Cardinals’ new Busch Stadium (2006) and Ballpark 
Village (2014). While the new Busch Stadium 
officially opened on April 10, 2006, and Ballpark 
Village officially opened on March 27, 2014, nearly 
eight years later, since the opening of Ballpark Village 
only included the completion of Phase 1, this 
interrelated development is actually ongoing and yet to 
reach fully planned and promised project completion. 
While originally proposed and envisioned as one 
simultaneous but layered project, the building and 
realization of the two entities eventually became two 
separate but interrelated projects, resulting in public 
financing of both. Through this evolution, the overall 
economic development project changed dramatically, 
including key actors, funding, design, and goals. This 
research examines both the individual and combined 
economic impact, both tangible and intangible, of the 





Economics of Professional Sports 
 
This section focuses on the big four major league 
sports: Major League Baseball (MLB), National 
Basketball Association (NBA), National Football 
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League, and National Hockey League (NHL). Relative 
to the ongoing subsidization of these leagues, 
particularly stadiums/arenas, Raymond J. Keating, 
who serves as chief economist with the Small Business 
& Entrepreneurship Council (SBE Council), argues: 
 
What is the most subsidized industry in all of 
America? Arguably, it is an industry 
dominated by small and mid-sized businesses. 
I would say that the Kings of the subsidies 
game are the four major league sports—the 
National Football League (NFL), Major 
League Baseball (MLB), National Basketball 
Association (NBA), and the National Hockey 
League (NHL)—along with minor league 
baseball and hockey. After all, what other 
industries—other than those actually operated 
by the government, like public schools—have 
the government subsidize almost all of the 
buildings in which they operate? Answer: 




Regarding the stadium building boom that started in 
the 1980s, Adam M. Zaretsky, Economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, states: 
 
Between 1987 and 1999, 55 stadiums and 
arenas were refurbished or built in the United 
States at a cost of more than $8.7 billion. This 
figure, however, includes only the direct costs 
involved in the construction or refurbishment 
of the facilities, not the indirect costs—such as 
money cities might spend on improving or 
adding  
to the infrastructure needed to support the 
facilities. Of the $8.7 billion in direct costs, 
about 57 percent—around $5 billion—was 
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Further, from 2000 to 2010, twenty-eight new 
stadiums were built for approximately $10 billion, 
with $5 billion coming from public funders. Thus, 
taxpayers covered nearly half the cost to either 
maintain or attract a team.
4 
 
While local or state officials, elected and non-elected, 
may often claim they are satisfying the demand for 
sports entertainment, their primary underlying 
argument is that these professional sports teams bring 
major league status to their communities. With this 
status, public officials argue teams bring positive local, 
state, regional, national and even possible global 
exposure, both in branding and marketing, which can 
translate to additional opportunities and revenue 
generation for local businesses. Thus, news jobs and 
business are attracted to the area.
5
 However, Eric Click 
contends, “Regarding this public investment and the 
economic benefits of professional sporting facilities, 
academic studies have found little, perhaps even a 
negative economic effect, with investment simply 




Even though very little economic evidence exists that 
public stadium investments generate new revenue from 
either local or non-local residents, including relative to 
tourism, the opposing belief is often propagated by the 
misuse of the “Multiplier Effect.” Zaretsky articulates, 
“Of the three circumstances described that purportedly 
generate new revenues, the third—funds keep turning 
over locally, thereby ‘creating’ new spending—is 
probably the most spurious from an economist's 
viewpoint. Such a claim relies on what are called 
multipliers. Multipliers are factors that are used as a 
way of predicting the ‘total’ effect the creation of an 
additional job or the spending of an additional dollar 
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Economics of Social Issues, 20th ed. (New York, NY: 
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8. 
will have on a community’s economy.”
7
 In 1976, 
economist Robert Lucas, who won the 1995 Nobel 
Prize in Economics, disproved the validity and 
applicability of the multiplier in macroeconomics, 
which is known as the “Lucas Critique.”
8 In essence, 
these multipliers are one giant variable generally 
calculated through many smaller variables (inputs), 
which can result in skewed and unreliable predicted 
outcomes—especially based upon who is calculating 
them and what they are being used for. 
 
Since high-paying jobs are isolated to primarily the 
players and management, who may or may not live in 
the area throughout the year, the jobs created by 
professional sports franchises are generally low-paying 
seasonal service sector jobs.
9 Further, Sharp, Register 
and Grimes point out the occurrence of a “substitution 
effect,” stating, “Finally, when a new sports team 
arrives in town, a substitution effect will occur with 
respect to consumer spending. Local fans who 
purchase tickets, concessions, parking, and souvenirs 
will have less to spend on other forms of 
entertainment. Thus, fewer dollars are available for 
spending at businesses such as local restaurants, 




Despite the overall multi-billion dollar professional 
sports industry, including some teams valued at over 
$1 billion, individual teams, not leagues, are relatively 
small businesses. Average team revenue in millions is: 
$260.78 (NFL), $204.57 (MLB), $126.78 (NBA), and 
$97.63 (NHL).  Note, this is only revenue, not net 
income (revenue minus expenses). Hence, these 
numbers are small in comparison to the billions of 
dollars generated by individual market leading firms 




With public officials increasingly having a hard time 
justifying public stadium subsidies, the justification is 
moving beyond economics benefits (direct and 
tangible) to possible social benefits (indirect and 
intangible). Click contends, “Recently, since economic 
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benefits have not been adequate to justify public 
financing of professional sports facilities, analysts 
have explored intangible benefits (benefits beyond 
economic) to justify public investment. Intangible 
benefits include non-user benefit, non-use value 
benefit, indirect benefit, public good benefit, public 
externality, public good externality, public 
consumption externality, social benefit, or social 
spillover benefit.”
12
 Specific claims of possible 
intangible benefits include civic pride, reputation, and 
image, but placing a value on these benefits is 
daunting.
13
 As a result, Sharp, Register and Grimes 
state, “Because the primary benefits of a professional 
sports team to its local community are intangible and 
hard to measure (how much is civic pride worth?), the 
debate concerning the use of public funds to support 
professional sports is likely to continue. However, 
many economists argue that public investments in new 
factories and schools would generate greater and 
longer-term economic returns to the community than 




Despite the complexity of measuring these intangibles, 
some scholars are using contingent valuation method 
(CVM) on professional sports teams/stadiums.
15
 Since 
standard market-based valuations do not apply, CVM 
attempts to monetarily quantify public goods and 
services through hypothetical market values that ask 
respondents willingness to pay (WTP) for a non-
market good or service.
16
 Click states, “Further, even 
though CVM studies have found WTP for intangible 
benefits, total WTPs (intangible WTPs combined with 
tangible WTPs) have generally been far less than 




In order to further understand not only the public 
stadium subsidies debate but also the overarching 
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professional sports subsidies debate, citizens and 
decision makers must also examine the unique 
structure of the four major league sports, particularly 
relative to their product and resource markets. While 
the leagues are comprised of contractually obligated 
teams, these member clubs are actually franchises that 
have “an exclusive right to product and market specific 
commercial goods and services within a specified 
geographic territory.”
18
 The leagues are controlled by 
owners that hire a commissioner (non-owner), whose 
primary task is to serve the best interest of the league 
in daily operations. The league rules governing the 
relationship between teams and players most directly 




Professional sports operate in imperfect markets, 
which operate somewhere between competitive 
markets and monopolistic markets.
20
 First, in the 
imperfect product markets, “buyers and sellers engage 
in the exchange of final goods and services.”
21
 Teams 
cooperate through league rules to limit economic 
competition among member clubs.
22
 As a result, 
Sharp, Register and Grimes write, “Professional sports 
leagues are economic cartels. Through the leagues, 
teams formally agree to behave as if they were one 
firm—a shared monopoly. By forming cartels, sports 
clubs can increase the joint profits for all members of 
the league by restricting output and increasing price 
relative to a competitive market. By sharing the joint 
profits from the sale of their output, leagues can ensure 
the long-term survival of member teams.”
23
 Through 
cooperative joint marketing and revenue sharing, 
member team profits result from three primary revenue 
streams: ticket and concession sales, merchandising 
rights for team souvenirs and novelties, and radio and 
television broadcast rights.
24
 Second, in the imperfect 
resource markets, “buyers and sellers engage in the 
exchange of the factors of production.”
25
 As a result, 
Sharp, Register and Grimes comment: 
 
                                                          
18









 Ibid., 249. 
23
 Ibid., 270. 
24
 Ibid., 251. 
25
 Ibid., 248. 
24 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 2 (Summer/Fall 2014) 
 
 
In the resource market, professional sports 
leagues enforce employment rules that grant 
member clubs exclusive rights to player 
contracts. When a club holds the exclusive 
rights to contract with an athlete, the club is a 
monopsony—the single buyer of labor in the 
market. A monopsony is able to employ 
workers at wages below what would be 
observed in a competitive market. In recent 
years, professional athletes have the right to 
free agency, which reduces the monopsony 
power of the clubs. In response to free agency, 
the average salaries in professional athletes 
have dramatically increased. The size of a 
professional athlete’s paycheck reflects the 




Since the 1970s, professional athletes have fought the 
monopolistic powers of the league cartels.  In response 
to team owners, players formed labor unions that are 
“a formal organization of workers that bargains on 
behalf of its members over the terms and conditions of 
employment.”
27
 Labor disputes between the owners 
and players’ unions sometimes result in strikes (labor 
work stoppages) or lockouts (management work 
stoppages). The stoppages primarily revolve around 
disagreements with salary caps. By attempting to limit 
team spending, player compensation is also limited, 
especially during free agency.
28
 A free agent is “a 
player whose contract is no longer held exclusively by 




The league cartels can continue to operate due to their 
unique exceptions, especially baseball, relative to 
antitrust laws.
30
 These laws are “legislation designed 
to promote market competition by outlawing and 
regulating anticompetitive business.”
31
 In 1922, the 
Supreme Court ruled in The Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore v. The National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs that interstate commerce does not 
apply to MLB, resulting in antitrust exemption and 
precedence that continues to be upheld in legal 
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challenges. While MLB’s blanket exemption is not 
applicable to other professional sports leagues, 
additional legal precedence continues to grant limited 
antitrust exemption to other leagues. For example, the 
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 permits the leagues to 
sell game broadcast rights in a “package deal” instead 
of teams competing against each other for 
broadcasting. Legal precedence implies that a team’s 
economic prosperity is dependent on the league’s 
economic prosperity.
32
 Further, recent debate involves 
the ability of leagues to control the number of teams, 
including expansion and contraction, and also location 
and relocation.
33
 Regarding this issue in MLB and its 
impact on stadium funding, Zimbalist comments:  
 
Further, the commissioner’s office has not 
refrained from threatening host cities again and 
again that a team will be allowed to move (to a 
vacant, viable market) if it does not get 
funding for a new stadium. And the 
commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel 
recommended that MLB follow a more lenient 
relocation policy. More recently, of course, the 






Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village 
 
In 2006, the St. Louis Cardinals’ new Busch Stadium 
(Busch III) opened in MLB, costing approximately 
$400 million. Public funding of 20-25% came from a 
combination of Missouri, St. Louis County, and St. 
Louis City governments through subsidies and/or 
incentives.
35
 Regarding Mark Lamping, then president 
of the Cardinals, and Bill DeWitt Jr., principal owner 
of the Cardinals, Tritto observes: 
 
In a last-minute scramble, the owners changed 
their plans. They had completed the sale of 
$200.5 million in private bonds to finance the 
project. Now DeWitt Jr. decided to eliminate 
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Bank One from the equation and bump the 
owner’s equity investment in the $387.5 
million park from $43.5 million to $90 million. 
The county’s $45 million loan, $30.4 million 
in state tax credits and the $12.3 million from 
the Missouri Department of Transportation 
would fund the balance of the project. 
DeWitt’s understanding of the plan’s financial 
components and his relationships in the 
banking industry kept the deal together, 




Beyond the stadium, shortly after its completion and 
opening, per the Cardinal’s agreement with the city, 
Ballpark Village was originally scheduled and required 
to break ground on a two-part construction project 
with commercial development as the first phase and 
residential development as the second phase. 
Originally, the Cardinals would have paid penalties for 
missing Ballpark Village building deadlines.
37
 
However, the Cardinals, along with co-developer 
Cordish Companies of Baltimore, have renegotiated 
Ballpark Village’s overall terms and structure on 
multiple occasions with the city and state, most 
recently agreeing to current terms in 2012.  These 
terms finally produced the actual construction and 
eventual opening of Ballpark Village in 2014.
38
 
Moreover, while the initial agreement did not have 
public subsidies for Ballpark Village, the newest 
agreement does, as Rivas asserts: 
 
The project has received a generous amount of 
local and state subsidies. It received $17 
million in bonds from the Missouri Downtown 
Economic Stimulus Authority (MoDESA). The 
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city authorized a one-percent sales tax at 
Ballpark Village, which is expected to generate 
$14 million over 25 years. About $5.5 million 
of that sales revenue would go to the city and 
the rest to the developers. Ballpark Village also 
benefits from a St. Louis City TIF (tax 
increment financing), which also puts taxpayer 




Further, while the bonds are secured by the Cardinals 
and Cordish, beyond the first phase, in additional 
possible phrases, if the developers hit project 
benchmarks on retail, office, residential and other 





Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village significant 
happenings include: 
1) In September 1994, the August Busch III regime 
hires Mark Lamping as team president who hires 
Walt Jocketty as general manager (GM) who hires 
Tony LaRussa as manager.
41
 
2) On March 21, 1996, the Gateway Group, Inc. 
purchases the Cardinals, which includes principal 
owner Bill DeWitt Jr. He has previous investments 
in the Baltimore Orioles, Cincinnati Reds, and 
Texas Rangers (the latter of which he was a co-
owner with friend President George W. Bush). The 
$150 million team purchase includes the stadium 
(Busch II), adjacent parking garages, and land. The 
group eventually sells the parking garages and land 
parcels for $101 million for a $49 million net cost. 
Additionally, August Busch III includes in the 
purchase $8 million in stadium improvements, 
including eliminating artificial turf and returning to 
grass. In 2001, the estimated ownership group 
worth exceeded $4 billion.
42
 
3) In 1997, the Cardinals, led by Mark Lamping, first 
pitch the idea of a new ballpark, stressing stadium 
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maintenance and improvement costs and proposing 
a public-private partnership to finance.
43
 
4) In 2000, the Cardinals, with Mark Lamping, start 
to pursue public stadium funding in the state 
Legislature (Jefferson City, Missouri).
44
 
5) In May 2001, Fred Lindecke, retired political 
reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and 
Jeannette Mott Oxford, grassroots coordinator and 
future state representative (D-St. Louis City), 
formed the Coalition Against Public Stadium 
Funding, encompassing members from all parties 
and backgrounds that were united by their 
opposition against “wasting tax revenue on 
subsidizing millionaires to build ball parks.” 
Throughout the summer, in St. Louis City, the 
coalition start circulating initiative petitions to get 
on the ballot an ordinance mandating a citywide 
vote for any public financing for a new ballpark or 
any professional sports facilities.
45
 
6) On June 19, 2001, the Cardinals sign a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the 
St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and Missouri 
covering plans for the new Ballpark and Ballpark 
Village in the downtown.
46
 Gov. Bob Holden, 
recently-elected Mayor Francis Slay, County 
Executive Buzz Westfall, and the Cardinals 




7) In early 2002, the Cardinals continue to pursue and 
lobby, including using lobbyists Tom McCarthy 
and Jon Bardgett, for public stadium funding 
through Mark Lamping in the state Legislature, but 
the Legislature (House) fails to vote on a $100 
million stadium funding bill package known as the 
Sport Center Redevelopment Act (SCRA). House 
Minority Leader Catherine Hanaway (R) and 
Representative Jim Foley (D) co-sponsored the 41-
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 Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public 
Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 82. 
page failed bill with Peter Kinder (R-Cape 
Girardeau) leading the charge.
48
 
8) By late May 2002, the Cardinals and Mark 
Lamping start to seriously pursue other financing 
options in locations outside of downtown St. 
Louis. By mid-June, the Cardinals have fifteen 
financing proposals, narrowing them down to nine 
sites (cities) by late August. Illinois Gov. George 
Ryan proposes five possible Metro East area sites: 
East St. Louis (two locations), Madison, Dupo, and 
Fairmont City. By late September, the East St. 
Louis Riverfront site of the Casino Queen emerges 
as the Illinois location, with a full plan in place 
calling for the Cardinals to pay $103.9 million 
total and the state stadium authority to pay the 




9) In May 2002, the Coalition Against Public 
Stadium Funding submits petitions totaling 18,000 
signatures to the St. Louis Election Board, with 
14,000 found valid. The Coalition’s ordinance, 




10) On November 4, 2002, the Cardinals and the City 
of St. Louis sign a deal, including the finalization 
of two agreements. The agreements include 
penalties if the Cardinals sell the team or move 
after stadium completion, and also requirements to 
make available 486,000 tickets at $12 a ticket in 
year 2000 dollars, redevelop two nearby stadium 
blocks for a $60 million Ballpark Village, donate 
at least $100,000 for neighborhood ballpark 
building, and donate 100,000 tickets to both St. 
Louis City and County youth and charitable 
organizations.
51 Further, by this point in the 
stadium funding process, nearly all articles 
regarding the stadium funding included a 
disclaimer, “Pulitzer Inc., which owns the Post-
Dispatch, and Pulitzer’s chairman, Michael E. 
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Pulitzer, are part-owners of the Cardinals. Their 
combined stake is slightly less than 4 percent.”
52
 
11) On November 5, 2002, the Coalition Against 
Public Funding for Stadiums referendum passes 
(55 to 45 percent). The passage cannot affect the 
public financing passed the day before, but all 




12) In late 2002, the St. Louis Board of Aldermen 
rescinds the five percent amusement tax, clearing 
the way for redevelopment of land south of Busch 
Stadium. In November, the Missouri 
Developmental Finance Board (MDFB) approves 
$29.5 million in tax credits for relocation costs of 
utilities and roads. In December, the Missouri 
Highways and Transportation Commission 
approves $12.3 million for a highway ramp 
relocation for the new stadium.
54
 
13) In March 2003, the Coalition Against Public 
Funding for Stadiums begins work on an initiative 
petition in St. Louis County, proposing a charter 
amendment county-wide vote for any taxpayer-
financed professional sports facility. The petition 
requires 25,000 voter signatures with signature 




14) By December 2003, the Cardinals had secured 10-
year leases for corporate suites with annual income 
of $135,000-$180,000 for each. In late December, 
the Cardinals also complete the sale of $200.5 
million in private bonds and utilize $90 million in 
owner’s equity investment to combine with St. 
Louis County’s $45 million loan, $30.4 million in 
Missouri tax credits, and the $12.3 million from 
the Missouri Department of Transportation to 
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15) On January 17, 2004, the Cardinals break ground 
on the new stadium.
57
 
16) In August 2004, the Coalition Against Public 
Funding for Stadiums files a petition with 35,000 
signatures to the St. Louis County Election Board. 
On August 18, 2004, the St. Louis County Election 
Board certifies 30,000 valid signatures, resulting in 
the charter amendment, Proposition A, going onto 
the upcoming November 2 ballot.
58
 
17) In November, Proposition A passes 72 to 28 
percent, being approved by 366,000 voters.  
Further, on November 17, 2004, bondholders, 
particularly UMB Bank, file suit in St. Louis 
County Circuit Court against the Coalition Against 
Public Funding for Stadiums. Fred Lindecke and 
state Representative Jeannette Mott Oxford are 
defendants/appellants. St. Louis County serves as a 
defendant/respondent. The bondholders seek 
declaratory judgment that Proposition A cannot be 




18) On March 3, 2005, the court finds in favor of the 
bondholders with the Coalition appealing to the 
Missouri Court of Appeals. St. Louis County has 
already paid out $2.3 million (2004) and $2.4 
million (2005) in bond costs.
60
 
19) On June 2, 2005, the Cardinals announce Cordish 
as co-developer on Ballpark Village.
61 
20) On January 17, 2006, the Missouri Court of 
Appeals again finds in favor of the bondholders 




21) On April 10, 2006, the new Busch Stadium, with 
the stadium naming rights sold to Anheuser-Busch 
for twenty years, has its grand opening ceremony 
on MLB’s opening day.
63
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22) On May 3, 2006, the Missouri Supreme Court 
refuses to hear the Coalition’s case.
64
 
23) On October 27, 2006, Mayor Slay, and co-
developers the Cardinals and Cordish announce 
initial Ballpark Village agreement.
65
 
24) On September 23, 2007, Mayor Slay announces 
Centene, Clayton, Missouri, Fortune 500 
healthcare-based corporation, will build a new 




25) In October 2007, the Cardinals fire GM Walt 




26) In March 2008, Cardinals President Mark Lamping 
resigns to become chief executive of the New 
Meadowlands Stadium Company, which is 
responsible for building the new NFL’s New York 
Giants and New York Jets stadium complex. The 
Cardinals replace him with Bill DeWitt III, son of 
Bill DeWitt Jr., who is the Cardinal’s chairman of 
the board and general partner.
68
 
27) On May 26, 2008, Centene announces it will no 
longer anchor or build new headquarters in 
Ballpark Village, instead choosing to look at 
options elsewhere.
69 
28) In July 2008, the Cardinals finally agree to fill in 
the giant mud hole in the Ballpark Village site.
70
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 Lisa R. Brown, “Centene Pulls Out of Ballpark Village 
Development,” St. Louis Business Journal. March 26, 2009, 
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Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 93. 
29) In April 2009, the Cardinals transform Ballpark 
Village site into a softball field and parking lot, 
which is available to rent.
71
 
30) In July 2009, the Cardinals host the 2009 MLB 
All-Star Game and Week.
72
 
31) On September 18, 2012, after the Missouri 
Downtown Economic Stimulus Act (MODESA) 
and then the St. Louis Board of Aldermen gave 
approval on back-to-back days in July, the 
Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB) 
approves the Ballpark Village project, finalizing 
the $17 million in bonds.
73
 
32) On December 19, 2012, the co-developers of the 
Cardinals and Cordish finalize their most recent 
agreement with St. Louis City.
74
 
33) On February 8, 2013, the co-developers break 
ground on the first phase of Ballpark Village.
75
 
34) On March 27, 2014, the first phase of Ballpark 
Village opens, which is a 120,000 square-foot 
structure containing nine marque venues. The first 
phase includes development of the site 
infrastructure for possible future construction of 




In growth machine theory, elite actors unite in their 
common goal of growth, leveraging significant 
influence and power over land areas and non-elites.
77
 
Relative to the local growth coalition (LGC) 
components: public officials (strong: pro driver), 
media (moderately strong pro), 
corporations/businesses (weak pro), and Cardinals 
(strong pro: catalyst), Click concludes, 
 
Regarding the push of the growth machine for 
public funding, public officials (driver) feared 
being blamed for the loss of an iconic 
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institution in the Cardinals (catalyst), which 
they not only perceived as an anchor to a city 
and downtown that had significantly declined, 
both in population and business, but also the 
primary positive image/brand of St. Louis 
throughout the community, State, Country, and 
possibly even globally. Even if the Cardinals’ 
new stadium was within visual distance in East 
St. Louis (IL), public officials viewed the 
departure of the Cardinals as a terminal blow 
to what was left of the City, a historic city no 
longer viewed as a corporate headquarters 
capital or a tier one city, but a branch and tier 
two city. To public officials, if St. Louis even 
had a chance of maintaining or creating 
positive momentum, much less recapturing its 
former glory, the Cardinals represented that 
last vestige of hope and promise. As a result, 
public officials and the overall growth machine 
did not see the need for a public vote or even a 
willingness to pay study, ignoring and working 
around two eventual and resulting public 







Relative to impact, particularly economic, the numbers 
available are generally either outdated projections or 
primarily unexplained or explained only by the 
Cardinals. With at least thirteen variations of a 
Ballpark Village proposed since the turn of the 
century,
79
 not including also the numerous proposed 
stadium variations, much of the impact data relies 
heavily on Ballpark Village inclusion. As a result, 
some information is increasingly unreliable and 
debatable as time passes and Ballpark Village changes 
dramatically. Note, while some data is for a standalone 
stadium, recall that Ballpark Village is an initial 
required part of the building of the stadium and public 
funding, so it is a package deal. 
 
                                                          
78
 Click, “The Impact of the Growth Machine on Public 
Financing of Professional Sports Facilities,” 211. 
79
 Kelsey Volkmann, “Slideshow: The 13 Versions of Ballpark 
Village,” St. Louis Business Journal. August 10, 2011, 
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Fred Lindecke and Tom Sullivan contend the media 
simply did not report the entire stadium story. The 
Cardinals put up an estimated $420 million in initial 
private funding: bonds cost plus retirement and 
owner’s equity investment. However, the Cardinals 
also receive significant returns through an estimated 
$520 million in public subsidies: $350 million from St. 
Louis City’s five percent admission tax 30-year 
waiver, $20 million from St. Louis City’s 25-year 
property tax abatement, $108 million paid by St. Louis 
County to retire the $45 million in stadium bonds, and 
$42 million from Missouri tax credits and highway 
ramp construction. Further, the Cardinals also receive 
an additional estimated $150 million in new stadium 
selling sources: $100 million over 30 years on stadium 
naming rights, $40 million from the Ballpark Founders 
Program that charges season ticket holders $2,000-
$7,500 for new stadium seats, and $10 million from 
old Busch Stadium memorabilia sales. Moreover, these 
amounts do not include increased Cardinal revenue 
from sources such as higher ticket prices, premium 




In 2002, the Missouri Department of Economic 
Development (MDED) produced economic impact 
studies through the Missouri Economic Research and 
Informational Center (MERIC) on proposed versions 
of the new Busch Stadium/Ballpark Village
81
 and new 
Busch Stadium
82
 at the time. While the studies make a 
number of assumptions and projections, follow-up post 
economic studies on the actual produced entities are 
seemingly not available. In particular, the studies rely 
significantly on three primary assumptions, MERIC 
concludes, “Annual ticket sales have averaged 
approximately 3 million over the past 20 years. More 
than 90% of all visitors to Busch Stadium reside 
outside the City. Almost 40% of all visitors to Busch 
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Stadium reside outside the State of Missouri.”
83
 These 
studies and primary assumptions are often utilized in 
Cardinal economic figures. 
 
In 2009, the current Cardinals President Bill DeWitt III 
states, “The provisions in the 2002 Redevelopment 
Agreement requiring the Cardinals to expend or cause 
to be expended $60 million of costs within the 
Ballpark Village area were conditioned upon the 
receipt of acceptable tax incremental financing in 
connection with such expenditures and the proposed 
project described in the agreement.”
84
 The five years 
before the Redevelopment Agreement were 1997-
2001, which serve as a tax baseline for the old stadium 
versus the first three years of the new stadium (2006-
2008).
85
 Before dropping the admissions tax, the 
Cardinals were paying 12% to St. Louis City and 
Missouri, which was the highest team tax rate in 
MLB.
86
 Regarding St. Louis City revenue projections, 
DeWitt III writes, “City revenue projections were 
based on using the average tax flows received from the 
period 1997-2001. This figure was grown at a 3% rate 
until 2005.  From 2005 to 2006, the city’s 5% 
admissions tax was dropped, but all other taxes were 
increased by 25%.  For 2007 and beyond, a 3% growth 
rate resumes off of 2006 levels.”
87
 With the city 
amusement tax gone, in 2006, the Cardinals (team and 
its affiliates) paid $10.8 million in direct city taxes, 
over $3.8 million beyond the original projection ($1.8 
million resulted from the post-season World Series 
championship run). With no playoffs in 2007 and 
2008, the Cardinals exceeded tax revenue projections 
by $1.7 million ($8.9 million total) and $1.9 million 
(9.4 million total) respectively. Further, from 1997-
2001, the Cardinals averaged $7.7 million in yearly 
taxes, but, from 2006-2008, the Cardinals averaged 
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Regarding Missouri revenue projections, DeWitt III 
adds, “State revenue projections were based on using 
the average tax flows received from the period 1997-
2001.  This figure was grown at 3% until 2005. From 
2005 to 2006, the taxes were increased by 25% to 
reflect new ballpark revenue. For 2007 and beyond, a 
3% growth rate resumes off of 2006 levels.”
89
 In 2006, 
the Cardinals paid the state $19.8 million in direct 
taxes ($3.2 million from postseason taxes). This figure 
exceeds the projection by $7.1 million. In 2007 and 
2008, the Cardinals exceeded state tax revenue 
projections by $2.9 million ($16 million total) and 
$3.35 million (16.9 million total) respectively. Further, 
from 1997-2001, the Cardinals averaged $9 million in 
yearly taxes, but, from 2006-2008, the Cardinals 
averaged $17.6 million, which represents a 96% 
average increase.
90
 Moreover, in regards to the public 
policy and financing of the new Busch Stadium, 
DeWitt III declares: 
 
Looking back at the deal, the Cardinals, the 
city of St. Louis, and the State of Missouri can 
all point to the success of the partnership. The 
facility opened to great reviews, and the 
Cardinals continue to put a winning team on 
the field. The city and state each benefit from 
growing streams of tax revenue and the project 
has sparked new adjacent development. And 
Ballpark Village, which is now possible 
because the new stadium opens up to the old 
ballpark site and creates views into the game, 
will add significant new tax growth in the 
future and solidify downtown St. Louis as one 





Assuming similar underlying principles apply to the 
projected and actual tax results provided by the 
Cardinals through their website (Busch Stadium 
Financing Report Card), the Cardinals continue to 
generate significant additional tax revenue for both St. 
Louis and Missouri. While some of the numbers 
previously provided by DeWitt III above are slightly 
up or down in comparison to these provided numbers, 
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they are very similar and likely only minor 
correctional adjustments were made. However, since 
the methodology on these numbers is not available, 
one is left to speculate. The Cardinals’ contend, “With 
eight years of actual results now in, it is clear that the 
tax revenue produced by the new ballpark to the City 
and State have exceeded expectations. The Cardinals 
and their affiliates have paid over $244 million in 
sales, income, real estate and other taxes to the City 
and State from 2006 to 2013.”
92
 One, St. Louis City 
average direct taxes paid from 2006 to 2013 are 
$11,179,000 versus $7,700,000 from 1997-2001. 
Playoff year average taxes (2006, 2009, and 2011-
2013) are $12,750,400 versus $9,645,333 in non-
playoff year average taxes (2007-2008, and 2009). The 
two highest tax years are World Series years: 2011 
(14,256,000) and 2013 ($14,432,000). Two, Missouri 
average direct taxes paid from 2006 to 2013 are 
$18,439,000 versus $9,100,000 from 1997-2001. 
Playoff year average taxes are $20,422,800 versus 
$16,584,667 in non-playoff year average taxes. The 
two highest tax years are again 2011 and 2013 




According to the Cardinals, in the building of Busch 
Stadium, 84% of the construction firms used were 
from the St. Louis area.
94
 A representative of the 
Cardinals declares: 
 
The Ballpark construction project was the most 
successful project of its size in St. Louis 
history with respect to the participation of 
minority and women-owned businesses. Eighty 
minority and women-owned firms received 
130 contracts totaling $65 million. In addition 
the mentor-protégé program was a tremendous 
success with leaving the market stronger by 
helping small start-ups. Every prime contractor 
on the project was required to actively mentor 
at least once city-certified minority or women-
owned firm. Twenty-two protégé firms 
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Minority and women-owned business participation 
exceeded Mayor Slay’s goal of both 25 percent 
minority-owned and five percent women-owned 
business participation.
96
 Further, relative to Ballpark 
Village, the Cardinals and Cordish write, 
 
A priority commitment of the Ballpark Village 
development team has been to ensure an 
inclusive approach in all aspects of the 
construction and operation of the district. 
Ballpark Village developers have worked in 
partnership with the city, community leaders 
and others to ensure that the economic benefits 
of the project reach historically disadvantaged 
sectors of the community. The developers used 
a variety of proactive strategies to maximize 
minority participation and workforce diversity 
during the construction, as well as to achieve a 
diverse operational workforce reflective of the 
St. Louis region. The first phase of the project 
is projected to achieve 21.62% MBE, 
7.78%WBE contractor participation and 31% 





The Cardinals and Cordish have also asked each tenant 
to voluntarily meet the state’s Minority and Women 
Owned Enterprise (M/WBE) and workforce goals in 
their interior construction. Ballpark Village has 
worked with the St. Louis Agency on Training and 
Employment (SLATE) to create a permanent 
recruitment and training office to assist city residents, 




Regarding Ballpark Village, the Cardinals write, “The 
construction of Ballpark Village, which began in 
February 2013, has been a welcome boost to our local 
economy. Over a thousand construction workers 
collaborated to build the first-phase of Ballpark 
Village, and close to a thousand permanent new jobs 
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have been created with the new businesses operating 
within the district.”
99
   
 
Note, in addition to being a co-developer, the 
Cardinals are utilizing some of the space for 
businesses, which also allows them to capture 
additional spending. Cardinals Nation is 34,000 square 
feet and four levels, featuring a two-story restaurant 
and bar, an 8,000 square foot Cardinals Hall of Fame 
and Museum, a Cardinals Authentics store and a 334-
seat rooftop deck to watch the games all-inclusively.
100
 
Further, Busch Stadium is also available for special 
event bookings.
101
 The Cardinals have recently even 




Before Ballpark Village, the 2009 All-Star game 
serves as an example of local economic user trends. 
Parker shares, “Those whose job it is to promote the 
city billed the five days of All-Star events as an 
overwhelming success, saying the estimates they used 
going in of 230,000 people spending $60 million 
appeared on target. But the businesses that boasted the 
biggest bumps in sales seemed to be those located near 
America's Center or Busch Stadium, or on the route 
between the two. Otherwise, downtown businesses 
reported mixed results.”
103
 Now, the “Ballpark Village 
Effect” is occurring. A number of bars, especially 
older and sports or baseball seasonal, are reporting a 
decline in sales, including some loosing employees to 
Ballpark Village. 
 
Even newer bars are having a hard time competing 
with Ballpark Village’s validated parking and massive 
marketing budget. One newer bar cites a 20-25 percent 
decline this year. With its non-game day and year 
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accessed October 21, 2014, 
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 Steve Parker, “What’s the Bird Say About the All-Star 
Game’s Economic Impact?,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch. July 15, 




around events, Ballpark Village is on pace to meet its 
projection of six million visitors this year. While Bill 
DeWitt III believes Ballpark Village is absorbing the 
majority of the game day crowd, he also believes 
Ballpark Village is increasing traffic in the area to 
other bars and restaurants. In response, many bars are 
attempting more innovative ideas or providing food 
and drink discounts, hoping this trend will start to wear 




From a marketing and branding standpoint, the 
Cardinals have a long and storied history, not only in 
St. Louis but also throughout baseball. Only the 
Yankees have won more World Series Titles. The 
Cardinals state, “The St. Louis Cardinals are one of the 
most storied franchises in all of baseball. Since they 
joined the National League in 1892, the Cardinals have 
won more than 9,500 games, 11 World Series 
Championships and 19 N.L. Pennants, 3 N.L. Eastern 
Division Titles, 8 N.L. Central Division Titles and 2 
N.L. Wild Card Titles. Over 40 former Cardinals 
players and managers are enshrined in the National 
Baseball Hall of Fame.”
105
 “The Cardinal Way” is 
often referred to, even recently receiving a Sports 
Illustrated cover and themed issue. However, not 
everyone agrees with or likes the Cardinal Way. In this 
year’s not overly scientific Wall-Street Journal (WSJ) 
Hateability Index, relative to the ten playoff teams, the 
Cardinals ranked the most hateable. The team 
primarily achieved this ranking through recent success 
(winning), being called Cardinal Nation, and also 
being referred to as having the best fans in baseball.
106
 
In response, Mayor Slay used this opportunity to write 
an open semi-humorous letter in WSJ informing 
everyone of why St. Louis is not simply “flyover 
country” or a “big deal in October” but for other 
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The more the Cardinals win, the more likely they are 
to increase taxes paid and publicity, so spur both 
tangible and intangible economic benefits. Since the 
current ownership started in 1996, the Cardinals are 
winning a lot, translating into increased attendance 
before and after the new stadium. The last nine years 
(1997-2005) the old stadium attendance averaged 
3,113,653 versus 3,367,058 new stadium attendance 
averaged for the first nine years (2006-2014). Further, 
the first four years (2006-2009) the new stadium 
attendance averaged 3,433,955 versus 3,313,540 the 
last five years (2010-2014). Overall, since 1996, the 
average yearly attendance is 3,209,532, with the team 
attendance reaching 3.5 million plus in 2005, 2007, 
and 2014.
108
 Moreover, relative to community impact, 
as previously disclosed, while some of the charitable 
work of the Cardinals is a contractual obligation, the 
Cardinals do substantial charitable work in the 




According to Forbes, in 2005, before the new Busch, 
the Cardinals’ team value was $370 million (10
th
 in 
MLB) with a 18% change increase and a -$3.9 million 
operating income.
110
 The current team value is $820 
million (8
th
 in MLB) with a 15% change increase and a 
$65.2 million operating income.
111
 With a $49 million 
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Since the Cardinals only recently completed and 
opened Phase 1 of the initially promised Ballpark 
Village, economic impact, both tangible and 
intangible, is difficult to measure for the overall Busch 
Stadium/Ballpark Village Project. In essence, led by 
government entities, the impact of this project will 
need to be measured incrementally and sometimes 
separately, as this now decade-old project may be 
complete unless another phase(s) of Ballpark Village is 
built. Relative to taxes and Busch Stadium, the 
Cardinals have certainly met and exceeded tax 
projections, which should continue and possibly even 
grow if the Cardinals maintain winning baseball and/or 
keep capturing additional revenue both in the stadium 
and out. However, how Ballpark Village will affect 
forthcoming taxes paid by the Cardinals is unclear, as 
this future number(s) could be separate from the 
stadium. Since this is the first year of operation and the 
Cardinals are the co-developers and also operate a 
number of venues within Ballpark Village, the overall 
numbers Ballpark Village yields after this fiscal year 
and how these numbers are broken down is pertinent to 
analysis. Further, relative to economic analysis by the 
governments, how do current tax gains offset the 
public subsidies, including debt retirement and St. 
Louis County? Overall, current economic analysis of 
the Busch Stadium/Ballpark Village Project lacks 
depth and needs a more integrated approach to put 






Especially relative to recent regional unrest, St. Louis 
City needs to continue to be cognitive of how these 
kinds of economic development projects fit into larger 
ongoing economic and social issues, particularly 
education, crime, and the deeply related poverty and 
discrimination. The city faces unique challenges by 
continuing to be separated from St. Louis County and 
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from the overall fragmented structure of government in 
St. Louis. 
 
While the city is often known for beer and baseball, St. 
Louis needs to ensure that beer and baseball serve only 
as distraction from everyday problems instead of as an 
excuse not to deal with other pressing issues in the city 
and beyond. St. Louis City, St. Louis County, Missouri 
and other applicable governments, including in Illinois 
and possibly even federal, must work together to 
ensure not only positive economic impact but also 
positive social impact for all citizens, not just elites. 
While one project cannot be expected to be the 
solution, this overall holistic approach can start to 
bridge the gap and help to make St. Louis not only a 
gateway but also a sustainable destination. 
